Review of FOI F23-1799 and BC Public Health’s Handling of COVID-19 Vaccines AEFI – Part 2

What Dr. Bonnie Henry Knew vs. What She Said

COVID-19 Vaccine Recent Developments

Dr. Bonnie Henry is the Provincial Health Officer of British Columbia who is the ultimate top bureaucrat responsible for BC’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout. Before diving into Dr. Henry’s handling of the COVID-19 vaccines and their associated Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI), the following recent developments should be fresh in mind.

US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

“HHS Senior Adviser Dr. Steven Hatfill revealed that RFK Jr. pulled mRNA funding after the data showed getting vaccinated was MORE dangerous than COVID itself.”¹

Dr. Hatfill said,

• “NO BENEFIT TO RISK RATIO for taking a messenger RNA vaccine.”

• “It was more dangerous to take a vaccine than it was to contract COVID-19 and be hospitalized with it.”

• “The side effects for this essentially gene therapy was so enormous and progressive it was difficult to fathom.”

• “Some of the detailed biochemistry studies started to appear in the literature and the sudden flood of messenger RNA it appears irrespective of what the messenger RNA is coding for, just the sheer amount of, number of, millions of molecules of messenger RNA entering the cell is creating biochemical havoc.”

• “It’s interfering with tumor suppressor genes.”

• “IT [Covid vaccine] HAD TO BE STOPPED.”

• “It turns out that the manufacturers did not do due diligence to ensure these were safe products before they were released onto the American market.”

• “These [covid vaccines] never prevented infection, never prevented disease, transmission”

• “There’s no good clinical data to ever show it reduced the severity of disease.”

Dr. Jay Bhattacharya, director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)

“Bhattacharya, a Stanford professor and co-author of the Great Barrington Declaration in 2020, explained that the cancellation came after recognizing the mRNA vaccine platform’s failure to deliver on public health expectations… Public distrust is widespread, making it clear the platform is no longer viable for mass vaccine campaigns.”²

HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.

“BARDA is terminating 22 mRNA vaccine development investments because the data show these vaccines fail to protect effectively against upper respiratory infections like COVID and flu. We’re shifting that funding toward safer, broader vaccine platforms that remain effective even as viruses mutate.”³

Sen. Ron Johnson Subpoenas HHS for Records on COVID-19 Vaccine Safety

On January 28, 2025, Senator Ron Johnson subpoenaed HHS for COVID-19 vaccine safety records, including high-adverse-event lots and Dr. Anthony Fauci's communications.

In April 2025, reports revealed that, CDC's vaccine safety team lead, Dr. Tom Shimabukuro—implicated in concealing an 82% miscarriage rate in a NEJM study—had records that were lost or possibly destroyed,⁴ prompting scrutiny from Johnson, Attorney General Pam Bondi, FBI Director Kash Patel, and HHS watchdog Juliet Hodgkins.

By March 2021, U.S. regulators knew of vaccine harms but concealed them⁵ to advance mass vaccination, likely quietly halting harmful lots. BC CDC data in the "Systematic Harm Management" section below illustrates this pattern of curtailing distribution of high-AEFI lots.

This timeline aligns with statements made by Dr. Bonnie Henry on March 15, 2021, where in statement #16, she oddly excluded the US when listing other jurisdictions that had found no safety signals, raising questions about potential information sharing. Would Dr. Henry and the BC CDC have information relevant to Sen. Johnson’s investigation? Are there any communications between BC health authorities and US health authorities that are relevant to Sen. Johnson’s investigation?

This analysis uses Shimabukuro's January 2021 V-Safe data as a baseline for non-serious AEFI rates, combined with BC CDC's non-serious-to-serious AEFI ratio, to estimate serious AEFI rates in British Columbia—aligning with Dr. Hatfill's views.

Introduction

Drawing from over 1,300 pages of AEFI data and related emails released by the Provincial Health Services Authority (PHSA) under Freedom of Information request F23-1799, this opinion post highlights differences between the non-public AEFI data available to Dr. Bonnie Henry and her public communications on March 15, 2021, prompting consideration of how such data was reflected in messaging.

On the morning of March 15, 2021, Dr. Henry received an internal BC CDC AEFI report showing COVID-19 vaccine AEFI rates up to 82.1 times higher than those of influenza vaccines. That afternoon, she held a press conference with Health Minister Adrian Dix where she described the vaccines as "safe and effective,", promoted an accelerated rollout, and made statements that appear inconsistent with the internal data she had just received, inviting examination of the alignment between private information and her public remarks.

Key Findings

• High AEFI Rates: non-public BC CDC data indicated AEFI rates ranging from 2.6 to 82.1 times higher than historic flu vaccine baselines, and many exceeding the AEFI rate of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine whose distribution was curtailed out of safety concerns, while Dr. Henry described the vaccines as safe, raising questions about the interpretation of safety in public statements.

• "Not Uncommon" AEFIs: Dr. Henry's reference to 469 serious AEFIs as 'not uncommon' aligns with National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI) classifications of ‘common’ AEFIs, which may seem at odds with her broader safety descriptions, encouraging review of how AEFI frequencies were contextualized by Dr. Henry.

• Gender Disparity: The data revealed AEFIs occurring at 8.77 times the rate in women compared to men, information that was not included in public communications, prompting questions about the disclosure of demographic-specific risks.

• Lot Variability and Management: Data showed notable variability across vaccine lots, with distribution patterns indicating possible management of higher-AEFI lots, while public statements emphasized overall safety, leading to inquiries about how lot-specific data influenced safety characterizations.

• Ethical Concerns: The differences between internal AEFI data and public statements invite consideration of how such information aligns with medical ethics principles on harm prevention, informed consent, and risk disclosure.

• The evidence reveals a troubling pattern of public statements that contradicted alarming internal safety data she received that same day and before.

Background

BC CDC Role

The BC Centre for Disease Control (BC CDC), operating under Public Health Services Authority (PHSA), monitors vaccine AEFI reports. Dr. Bonnie Henry received daily updates on AEFI reports.

The Critical Timeline: March 15, 2021

On the morning of March 15, 2021, Dr. Henry received an internal BC CDC AEFI report showing COVID-19 vaccine harm rates alarmingly exceeding those of influenza vaccines. That same afternoon, Dr. Henry held a press conference where she made multiple statements about vaccine safety that seemed inconsistent with this data. The email⁶ below shows that Dr. Henry was in possession of the full non-public BC CDC AEFI report of March 15^th, 2021, in attachment.⁷

The Critical Data Dr. Henry Possessed

See the Supporting Data Tables section below.

On the morning of March 15, 2021, Dr. Henry received an internal BC CDC AEFI report⁸ that showed alarming safety data about COVID-19 vaccines compared to historical flu vaccine baselines. Hours later, she held a press conference where she made several statements not aligned with this safety data.

Historical Safety Baseline (Influenza Vaccines)

The BC CDC compared COVID-19 vaccine AEFI rates with historic flu AEFI rates as a risk baseline:

• Total AEFI rate: 6.5 per 100,000 doses

• Serious AEFI rate: 1.48 per 100,000 doses

The Reality of COVID-19 Vaccine Safety Data

The March 15, 2021, internal report showed COVID-19 vaccine AEFI rates that exceeded these baselines. Over the 14 distributed Pfizer and Moderna lots:

• High Variability of AEFI rates: Total AEFI rates ranged from 17.09 to 544.55 and Serious AEFI rates ranged from 4.98 to 113.86 per 100,000 doses

• AEFI rates: Aggregate Total and Serious AEFI rates of 123.96 and 32.77 per 100,000 doses respectively.

• Relative Risk vs. Historic Flu: Risk of any and Serious AEFI were 19.1 (123.96/6.5) and 22.1 (32.77/1.48) greater than the flu vaccines.

Per Vaccine Lot Overall Pattern:

• COVID-19 vaccine relative risk of any AEFI to historic flu ranged from 2.6 to 82.1 times greater than flu vaccines

• Risk of serious AEFI ranged from 3.3 to 75.4 times greater than flu vaccines

• Eight of the 15 monitored lots had total AEFI rates within the "uncommon" range (100-1,000 per 100,000 doses)

• Two lots had serious AEFI rates within the "uncommon" range

Disproportionate Gender Disparity in AEFIs against Women

The March 15, 2021, report clearly indicated a significant gender disparity in associated harms:

• Male AEFIs: 48 cases

• Female AEFIs: 421 cases

Most Problematic Lots:

• Moderna 300042460: 544.55 total AEFI rate (82.1 times higher than flu vaccines)

• Pfizer EK4175: 230.77 total AEFI rate (34.8 times higher than flu vaccines)

• Pfizer EP6017: 18 Anaphylaxis AEFI reports (15 female, 3 males), distributed to 12% of BC as of March 11^th 2021.⁹

• Moderna 300042698 (Dr. Hoffe lot): 328.5 total AEFI rate (49.5 times higher than flu vaccines)

Analysis of Bonnie Henry’s statements

See the Dr. Henry's Public Statements - March 15, 2021 section below

Discrepancies in Vaccine Safety Descriptions

Statement #1 (4:45): "With the majority of our seniors and elders and care homes now immunized and seeing how effective that has been, today our masked clinics for seniors and elders in the community started off across the province and I think this is an exciting day for all of us. It is to start of what is going to be ramped up quickly over the next coming weeks and months to be sure that everybody in British Columbia has access to one of our safe and effective vaccines."

Her own data showed the relative risk of any AEFI was up to 82 times higher than accepted flu vaccine baselines. This highlights differences where known alarming harm levels were not detailed publicly, while immunization was promoted amid documented risks, warranting review and halting distribution.

Statement #2 (5:35): "we extended the interval with the knowledge that we have about the protection we get from a single dose, that has meant we have not been able to accelerate many of the immunizations activities that we started and we have accelerated our timelines for protecting people across the province."

Given the AEFI rates in the internal data, one might question whether accelerating the rollout aligned with a precautionary approach, prompting further review of decision-making processes.

Statement #15 (10:19) "we also know that the vaccines that we have are remarkably effective and safe and the risk of having the vaccine is dramatically decreased compared to the risk of having COVID-19."

This statement goes to the heart of medical ethics. Dr. Henry made definitive risk-benefit claims that one would agree is contradicted by the alarming AEFI rates shown in her internal data.

469 AEFIs - Definition Disconnect

Statement #7 (7:00): "In BC we have had 469 AEFIs that are serious that we’ve looked into and 46 anaphylaxis, or allergic reactions to the vaccine..."

Dr. Henry described all 469 AEFIs as serious, while the report listed only 124 as serious.

This is the non-public BC CDC AEFI report Dr. Henry got AEFI numbers from:

Differences appear between Dr. Henry's perception of serious AEFIs and BC CDC classifications, prompting examination of how definitions were applied or interpreted. One might opine a fundamental misunderstanding of AEFI definitions or her true opinion of the severity of these AEFIs.

A Key Insight: The "Not Uncommon" Reference to AEFIs

Statement #7: (7:00) "In BC we have had 469 AEFIs that are serious and 46 anaphylaxis, or allergic reactions to the vaccine..."

Statement #8: (7:22) "These reactions are not uncommon and we continue to monitor our distribution to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot."

Dr. Henry is discussing the 469 AEFIs, she’s referring to the 14 lots that had an aggregate Total AEFI rate of 123.96 per 100,000 doses and described these 469 serious AEFIs as "not uncommon," potentially revealing her true view on their real frequency.

NACI classifies AEFI rates¹⁰ as:

• Very Rare: Less than 0.01% (less than 10 AEFIs per 100,000 doses)

• Rare: 0.01% to less than 0.1% (10 to 100 AEFIs per 100,000 doses)

• Uncommon: 0.1% to less than 1% (100 to 1,000 AEFIs per 100,000 doses)

• Common: 1% to less than 10% (1,000 to 10,000 AEFIs per 100,000 doses)

• Very Common: More than 10% (10,000+ AEFIs per 100,000 doses)

The BC CDC data showed an aggregate AEFI rate of 123.96 per 100,000—falling in the "uncommon" category. As an expert familiar with NACI terms, Dr. Henry's phrasing ("not uncommon") implies she viewed these serious AEFIs as "common" or "very common."

This characterization contradicts her safety assurances in Statements #1 and #15, raising questions about her public messaging intent.

Disproportionate female COVID-19 vaccines AEFIs

The AEFI report Dr. Henry received hours prior her afternoon conference showed a male/female breakdown (48/421) of the 469 COVID-19 vaccine AEFIs reflecting a ratio of 8.77 female AEFIs for every male AEFI.

This disproportionate impact on women was not mentioned in Dr. Henry’s public statements, which may lead to considerations of how such gender-specific data and other crucial details to informed consent were prioritized in communications.

Section “Monika Naus Warned Bonnie Henry of a Toxic Lot” of the substack post Review of FOI F23-1799 and BC Public Health’s Handling of COVID-19 Vaccines AEFI – Part 1, reported Monika Naus, on March 11^th 2021, four days before, informed Dr. Henry that Pfizer lot EP6017 was associated with 18 anaphylaxis AEFIs, 15 of which were from females. EP6017 represented 12% of doses distributed in BC to date.

Lots AEFI Rates Variability

Dr. Henry's Statements #3, #8, and #12—delivered in 3-4 minutes—show inconsistencies in tone, implications, and facts about vaccine safety monitoring, especially lot-specific AEFIs.

Statement #3 (5:54): "One of the important things that we do do is making sure that we understand the safety of every dose that is given to every person in this province."

• This conveys a strong assurance of comprehensive, granular oversight. It implies that public health authorities have a robust system in place to evaluate and confirm the safety of every individual dose, down to the recipient level. The repetition ("do do") emphasizes commitment, positioning the process as proactive and thorough, with no room for unknowns or variability in safety.

Statement #8 (7:22): "These reactions are not uncommon and we continue to monitor our distribution to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot."

• Here, the focus shifts to acknowledging that certain reactions (likely AEFIs, such as allergic responses or other side effects) occur at expected rates but are being managed through ongoing distribution monitoring. The phrasing "to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot" implies preventive action to avoid or rule out disproportionate issues tied to specific vaccine batches (i.e., "hot lots" with higher adverse event rates). It reassures that any potential lot variability is being actively mitigated, suggesting no current evidence of such problems.

Statement #12 (9:29): "the other thing that I think is really important is you know our safety monitoring is working and we know that certain lot numbers might be more associated with these and others and that the investigation is happening."

• This affirms the effectiveness of monitoring but introduces an admission: data indicates that "certain lot numbers might be more associated" with AEFIs, prompting an active investigation. The word "know" suggests emerging evidence or signals of uneven risk across lots, moving from prevention to response. It implies that lot-specific associations are not just hypothetical but observed, requiring further scrutiny.

Key Contradictions and Inconsistencies

Statements #3, #8, and #12, delivered in quick succession, create a narrative progression that undermines itself, leading to apparent contradictions in transparency, assurance levels, and the portrayed effectiveness of safety protocols. These can be grouped into three main areas:

1. Contradiction in Assurance of Safety Oversight (Statement #3 vs. Statements #8 and #12):

• Statement #3 claims an exhaustive understanding of "the safety of every dose," implying complete knowledge and control over all variables, including batch-level risks. This sets a high bar for public confidence, suggesting that any issues would be preempted or immediately known.

• However, Statements #8 and #12 reveal limitations: monitoring is ongoing to "make sure" no lot issues exist (#8), and there is actual knowledge of potential lot associations requiring investigation (#12). If safety is truly understood for every dose, why is there a need for continued monitoring to confirm the absence of lot problems, or an investigation into emerging signals? This inconsistency suggests the initial claim of comprehensive understanding may be overstated, as it doesn't align with the admission of uncertainties or variability in lot performance. It could erode trust by implying that the system isn't as airtight as first presented.

2. Contradiction in Handling Lot-Specific Risks (Statement #8 vs. Statement #12):

• Statement #8 positions monitoring as a safeguard to prevent or confirm the absence of lot-specific associations ("to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot"). The language is preventive and reassuring, implying that distribution is managed to maintain uniformity and that no disproportionate risks are present—or if they were, they would be caught early.

• In contrast, Statement #12 explicitly acknowledges that monitoring has detected potential lot-specific associations ("we know that certain lot numbers might be more associated"), shifting to a reactive stance with an ongoing investigation. This creates a direct inconsistency: if the monitoring in Statement #8 is effectively preventing lot problems, how can Statement #12 admit to knowing about them just minutes later? It suggests either a rapid evolution in information (unlikely in such a short time) or inconsistent messaging, where the preventive claim is contradicted by evidence of existing issues. This could imply that authorities are downplaying risks initially before conceding them.

3. Overall Inconsistency in Messaging Tone and Progression:

• The sequence starts with absolute assurance (Statement #3), moves to proactive prevention of hypothetical issues (Statement #8), and ends with admission of real, investigable concerns (Statement #12). Given the minute markers (5:54 to 9:29), this rapid shift within about 3-4 minutes feels disjointed, potentially confusing the public.

• The progression from "we prevent it" to "we're investigating it" highlights a gap in consistency.

• One possible interpretation of these inconsistencies is that public messaging was framed to minimize vaccine hesitancy, even if this meant emphasizing certain aspects of safety data over others.

In summary, within just 3-4 minutes of the press conference, Dr. Henry moved from absolute safety assurance to acknowledging known lot-specific problems under investigation. This rapid shift suggests either:

• Contradictory messaging strategies within the same presentation

• Possible awareness that the initial safety assurances could not be sustained under questioning

A Revealing Slip of the Tongue

Statement #5: (6:15) "We report weekly on the adverse effects following immunizations (AEFIs) we call them. And this is important. We look for anything that people might have that, [would be, could be] related to the vaccine they receive within the timeframe after the receipt of vaccine we know that there are many events that happen on a regular basis every day whether..."

In statement #5 Dr. Henry made a significant verbal error that suggests her true beliefs about vaccine AEFI causation may be different than what she communicated. While discussing weekly AEFI reporting, she initially stated that adverse events "would be" related to vaccines, then immediately corrected herself to say they "could be related to the vaccine they receive."

This correction points to a crucial distinction in her thinking:

• "Would be" expresses certainty or strong expectation - implying she believes adverse events will have a causal relationship to vaccines under certain conditions.

• "Could be" expresses mere possibility - suggesting only a potential connection without certainty.

The linguistic difference is significant because "would be" indicates a stronger likelihood or expected outcome when specific conditions are met, while "could be" remains speculative and open-ended. Her self-correction may reflect the difficulty of phrasing AEFI discussions precisely in a live setting, though some listeners might interpret it as revealing a stronger underlying view of vaccine causation. This slip of the tongue is also consistent with the above-mentioned implication of her characterization that 469 AEFIs were serious and not uncommon, i.e. ‘common’, between 1% to 10% as per NACI AEFI rate classification.

Safety Signal Denials Contradicted by Internal Evidence

Differences Between Safety Signal Statements and Internal Evidence

Statement #4 (6:05): “And we follow strict protocols to identify and address any safety signals that show up and we have heard about this around the world."

Statement #16 (10:32): "There are no safety signals in the UK or in India or in Canada."

It is notable that Dr. Henry excluded the US, the leading jurisdiction on vaccine safety, while giving a listing of other jurisdictions monitoring AEFIs that the BC CDC is looking at.

Statement #11 (9:16): "we are confident that is not a risk we are seeing here in Canada with the AstraZeneca..."

· This denies AstraZeneca risks in Canada.

Internal Evidence of Known Safety Signals:

In Part I, I covered that Monika Naus Warned Bonnie Henry Twice on March 11th, 2021 over serious AEFIs.

Three weeks later, April 8, 2021: Monika Naus wrote to Heather Amos that safety signals associated with AstraZeneca had caused BC to limit its use to the 55-65 age group, directly contradicting Dr. Henry's confident March 15th statement about safety. Monika Naus encourages Heather Amos who routinely liaised with NLK Strategies, a public relations firm hired by Dr. Henry's office, to embellish the ‘comms’, in other words, to downplay the known risks.

As demonstrated in section Higher AEFI Rates Associated with Higher mRNA Content of part I, Dr. Henry had received alarming US safety data, from the US CDC's January 27th, 2021, Shimabukuro slide deck, showing:

• Non-serious adverse events ranged from 8,900 to 70,700 non-serious AEFIs per 100,000 doses

• These rates were hundreds of times higher than flu vaccine non-serious AEFI rates¹¹

• The data came from millions of Americans who self-reported through a phone app, making the data more accurate and timelier than BC's reporting system

• When AEFI rates, regardless of the seriousness of the AEFI, are unexpectedly high relative to a background rate, that’s a safety signal.

Relating BC AEFI Data to US CDC V-Safe Data (Shimabukuro slide deck)

Dr. Henry understood the significant differences between BC's AEFI reporting system and the US V-Safe system:

BC System: Patients must get doctor appointments, doctors must be willing to file reports (despite legal requirements but facing discouragement and penalties), reports go through health authority medical officers before reaching BC CDC.

US V-Safe System: Millions of Americans directly self-reported health status through a smartphone app, providing more accurate and timely data.

The March 15th AEFI Data Reality

By March 15th, 2021, BC CDC data showed 469 AEFIs (124 serious, 345 non-serious), meaning for every 2.78 non-serious AEFIs, there was 1 serious AEFI. It is presumable that, as an expert, Dr. Henry understood from the Shimabukuro V-safe data that the true serious AEFI rates in BC would be much higher.

For instance, the US CDC's V-safe data in the Shimabukuro slide deck showed non-serious AEFI rates of at least 10% (10,000 per 100,000 doses). BC CDC data indicated 1 serious AEFI per 2.78 non-serious ones. Combining these yields an implied serious AEFI rate of 3,597 per 100,000—within NACI's "common" category (1%–10%). This may explain Dr. Henry's slip in Statement #5 and her labeling all 469 AEFIs as serious, versus BC CDC's 124.

Dr. Henry's Statements #4, #11 and #16 on safety signals appear at variance with known data, prompting scrutiny on her selective geographic and signal references. She had direct knowledge of:

• BC CDC-detected safety signal (Bell’s Palsy vs. flu),

• European safety concerns,

• US V-Safe data showing alarmingly elevated common and very common AEFI rates compared to historic flu rates from the BC CDC, and

• Knowledge of the relationship between very common non-serious AEFIs and how that translated into serious AEFIs.

Issues in the Safety Monitoring Process Described by Dr. Henry

Dr. Henry made statements about safety monitoring. Below is a breakdown of each statement and explanation of the inconsistencies/contradictions with the BC CDC data Dr. Henry had received hours before.

Statement #4 (6:05): “And we follow strict protocols to identify and address any safety signals that show up and we have heard about this around the world."

• This implies a proactive, effective system for detecting and resolving signals (e.g., unexpected clusters or elevated rates), with global awareness informing actions.

Statement #6 (6:52): "we have a process to see if the events that happened are related to the vaccine are not."

• This describes a systematic causality assessment to determine vaccine relatedness, suggesting thorough investigation to distinguish coincidental events from true AEFIs.

Statement #12 (9:29): "the other thing that I think is really important is you know our safety monitoring is working and we know that certain lot numbers might be more associated with these and others and that the investigation is happening."

• This affirms monitoring efficacy, acknowledges potential lot associations (implying data-driven awareness), and notes ongoing investigations, positioning the system as responsive.

Statement #13 (9:50): "sometimes these things happen in people who happen to receive immunization and we monitor to make sure that it's not greater than we might be expected..."

• This downplays AEFIs as possibly coincidental, with monitoring ensuring rates stay within "expected" levels (using flu baselines as the benchmark).

Key Inconsistencies and Contradictions

The four statements (#4, #6, #12, and #13) describe a robust, effective safety monitoring system for COVID-19 vaccines. However, these claims are inconsistent with or contradicted by The Critical Data Dr. Henry Possessed, which reveals unaddressed signals, rates far exceeding expectations, and a gap between private knowledge and public actions (e.g., no pauses in distribution despite lot issues). The contradictions can be grouped into four areas:

1. Failure to Address Identified Safety Signals (Contradicts #4 and #12):

• Statement #4 claims strict protocols to "address" signals, and #12 says monitoring is "working" with investigations underway. Yet, the data showed clear signals (e.g., Bell's Palsy flagged March 11; Pfizer EP6017 18 Anaphylaxis AEFIs; overall serious AEFIs 22x flu baseline) that were not publicly addressed or used to alter the rollout. Instead, distribution accelerated (as per Statement #2), and harmful lots like Moderna #300042698 (50x flu risk) continued use until later quiet management. Internal emails (e.g., from Monika Naus) warned Dr. Henry of these, but public reports denied signals existed in Canada (contradicting her own Statement #16: "There are no safety signals in the UK or in India or in Canada"). This suggests protocols identified issues but did not lead to transparent addressing, discrediting claims of safety monitoring efficacy.

2. Inadequate Causality Assessment and Downplaying of Relatedness (Contradicts #6 and #13):

• Statement #6 implies a reliable process to assess relatedness, while #13 attributes events to coincidence unless exceeding expectations. However, rates were already "greater than expected" (e.g., 19x higher total AEFIs vs. flu), with lot-specific spikes (e.g., Pfizer EP6017's 40 anaphylaxis/100k) suggesting non-coincidental patterns. US V-Safe data (known to Dr. Henry) showed high post-vaccination events, implying underreporting in BC's system (which relied on doctor filings vs. direct self-reports). Despite this, no adjustments were made, and public messaging deflected harms to COVID-19 itself (e.g., Statements #10 and #14). FOI evidence of manipulated "serious" definitions (to reduce public counts) further undermines the claimed process, as internal serious rates (27.5% of AEFIs) were higher than acknowledged.

3. Acknowledgment of Lot Issues Without Action (Primarily Contradicts #12, with Ties to #4):

• Statement #12 admits knowledge of potential lot associations and ongoing investigations, but this is inconsistent with the preventive tone in #4 (strict protocols to address signals). Internal data confirmed lot variability (e.g., 8/15 lots in "uncommon" range: 100–1,000 AEFIs/100k; rates 2.6–82x flu), yet no public warnings or halts occurred—only later potential "quiet withdrawal" of high-harm lots (e.g., by September 2021, 92% of lots exceeded flu baselines, but 22.4% of doses came from lots worse than curtailed AstraZeneca). This reactive admission in #12 (minutes after preventive claims) highlights messaging inconsistency, as investigations did not prevent distribution of known risky lots.

4. Overall Undermining of Monitoring Effectiveness and Transparency (Affects All Statements):

• The sequence (#4 → #6 → #12 → #13) builds a narrative of control, but the data shows systemic failures: unaddressed gender disparities (8.77x higher in females, not disclosed). BC CDC's public AEFI reports (e.g., up to May 2021) mirrored Dr. Henry's assurances ("no signals," "not higher than expected"), but FOI reveals withheld details, suggesting prioritization of rollout over transparency. This erodes credibility in the "strict protocols" (#4), relatedness process (#6), working monitoring (#12), and expectation checks (#13).

In summary, Dr. Henry's statements portrayed a robust safety system, yet internal data revealed overlooked or downplayed issues, including AEFI rates far exceeding baselines and signals without commensurate actions. These contradictions arise from the gap between what she knew that day and what she communicated.

The data raises questions about whether detected signals influenced promotion decisions, potentially indicating areas for improving monitoring and response protocols.

Dr. Henry's Expressions of Confidence in AstraZeneca Amid Emerging Concerns

Statement #9 (7:44): "We have seen reports in some countries that have led to them suspending the use of certain lots of the AstraZeneca vaccine in some countries around the world."

Statement #10 (8:28): "But we also know that they [conditions related to blood clots] are associated sometimes with COVID itself."

Statement #11 (9:16): "we are confident that is not a risk we are seeing here in Canada with the AstraZeneca..."

The Internal Reality: Known Safety Concerns

Dr. Henry's public confidence statements appear inconsistent with the concerns expressed in internal communications she had received. On March 11th, 2021—four days before her press conference — Dr. Monika Naus (Medical Head, Immunization Programs) had sent Dr. Henry an email containing alarming information:

• An AstraZeneca lot hold was in place

• Notes about AstraZeneca suspension concerns

• A safety signal had been detected for Bell's Palsy compared to flu vaccines

Dr. Henry's Statement #11 expressing confidence in AstraZeneca safety was directly contradicted by subsequent internal communications. On April 8th, 2021—just three weeks after her confident press conference—Dr. Naus wrote to Heather Amos that safety signals associated with the AstraZeneca vaccine had caused BC to limit its use to the 55-65 age group.

Additional Internal Concerns

Ten days after Dr. Henry's March 15th AEFI remarks, Dr. Eleni Galanis wrote to both Dr. Henry and Dr. Naus recommending they "put the brakes on the AstraZeneca vaccine distribution" and noting "excess risk associated with AZ vaccination."

This timeline reveals a clear pattern: Dr. Henry publicly expressed confidence in AstraZeneca safety on March 15th while already knowing about lot holds and suspension concerns from March 11th. Within weeks, internal communications confirmed the safety problems she had publicly dismissed, leading to age restrictions and distribution slowdowns that directly contradicted her confident public statements.

Internal communications from March 11, 2021, indicate BC CDC staff raised concerns about AstraZeneca safety, including lot holds and a Bell’s Palsy signal. Dr. Henry’s statements expressing confidence in AstraZeneca’s safety contrast with these concerns, raising questions about the intents of her public messaging.

Deflection of AEFI onto COVID-19 Itself

Dr. Henry used a consistent deflection technique in two key remarks, shifting attention away from vaccine-related adverse events (AEFIs) and toward COVID-19 itself:

Statement #10 (8:28): "But we also know that they [conditions related to blood clots] are associated sometimes with COVID itself."

Statement #14 (9:58): "but we also know that infection with COVID-19 can lead to these types of conditions as well at a much higher rate we have seen that here in BC..."

In both statements, Dr. Henry responded to concerns about vaccine harms by immediately pointing to COVID-19 infection as the cause of similar medical conditions. This framing downplays vaccine risk by implying that such adverse events would likely occur anyway from the virus.

Repeated attributions of serious AEFIs to COVID-19 may shift focus from vaccine data, raising questions about the emphasis in risk-benefit discussions. Instead of acknowledging the documented high and concerning levels of harm in the vaccine data, she redirected public attention and responsibility to the virus.

The emphasis on COVID-19 risks in responses may shift focus from vaccine data, prompting consideration of how risk-benefit discussions were framed.

Transmission Reduction Claims

In Statements #17 and #18, Dr. Henry claimed COVID-19 vaccines prevent community transmission:

Statement #17 (12:19): "we knew that this was in consultation with my colleagues in public health using the vaccine to help break chains of transmission in communities particularly where we are seeing ongoing risk and transmission and clusters and outbreaks in workplaces these are the outbreaks that are happening now and [this helps us to reduce the transmission that we are seeing in our community right now] in the coming days..."

Statement #18 (14:34): "everyone who is immunized also protects the rest of us and when we immunize to manage these outbreaks that we are having right now putting out those sparks [reduces our community transmission and that protects us all]"

The Problem: No Supporting Data

At the time, limited manufacturer data on transmission reduction was available, yet Dr. Henry's statements portrayed vaccines as reducing community transmission, raising questions about the evidentiary basis.¹²

She claimed vaccines were:

• "Helping to reduce the transmission that we are seeing in our community right now"

• "Reducing our community transmission"

• Allowing vaccinated individuals to "protect the rest of us"

The Critical Gap in Evidence

These transmission prevention claims emerged amid incomplete trial data, prompting evaluation of how evidence supported messaging. At approval and Dr. Henry's March 2021 statements, neither Moderna nor Pfizer provided data showing their vaccines reduced virus transmission.

The Implication

Dr. Henry based public policy and recommendations on unproven benefits, presenting transmission reduction as fact ("we knew that this was... this helps us to reduce the transmission…") when manufacturers hadn't demonstrated it during approval.

One could view this as a significant disconnect between available scientific evidence and public health claims justifying vaccination policies for workplace outbreaks and community transmission.

These assertions are further contradicted by:

• Dr. Hatfill: Vaccines "never prevented infection, never prevented disease, transmission" and lack "good clinical data to ever show it reduced the severity of disease."

• HHS Secretary RFK Jr.: mRNA vaccines "fail to protect effectively against upper respiratory infections like COVID and flu."

Poor Choice of Words or Suspicious Telegraphing?

As Dr. Henry concluded her claims about vaccines reducing transmission, she added Statement #19 (14:48): “… and it means that we all move up the line.”

Not understanding the meaning of that sentence, I found it out-of-place and cryptic. In the context of a harmful mass-vaccination campaign, this phrase—spoken by someone possibly not believing her own words—raises questions. I queried Grok AI and ChatGPT for interpretations.

Grok AI (after reviewing 55 web pages): The phrase metaphorically refers to mortality's inevitability: humans stand in a "line" to death; when one dies, others advance closer. It reminds of life's fragility, popularized in poems and reflections on grief, though not a standard idiom.

ChatGPT: It typically means advancement through succession (e.g., in jobs, ranks, or life) when someone ahead leaves, retires, or dies. In mortality contexts, it softly acknowledges aging or death: survivors "move up" toward their own end.

Statements #18 and #19 form one sentence: #18 promotes vaccination to protect others and reduce transmission, while #19 implies "we're all going to die." This juxtaposition seems oddly ominous.

Dr. Henry's Suppressed Smile During High Case Numbers Discussion

Statement #20 (17:35): "the number of new cases is still very high much higher than I would like it to be..."

During this statement, some viewers perceived her expression as a smile, which they felt contrasted with the serious content. While interpretations vary, such moments may invite differing perceptions of tone and intent.

This incongruence suggests awareness of a mismatch between her public claims and reality, questioning her belief in the situation's severity and the authenticity of her messaging.

Conclusion on Dr. Henry’s March 15th 2021 Statements on COVID-19 vaccines

What was really on Dr. Henry’s mind when she gave that press conference on COVID-19 AEFIs on March 15^th 2021????

Systematic Harm Management: The September 2021 Evidence

Six months after Dr. Henry’s March 15, 2021, press conference, the non-public BC CDC AEFI report of September 15^th, 2021¹³, revealed ongoing patterns in vaccine safety data. This section outlines the key findings from that report, including historical baselines for comparison, the observed safety profile across vaccine lots, distribution patterns suggesting managed risk, and implications for public health practices.

Historical Safety Baselines

The benchmarks:

1. Influenza Vaccines (Acceptable Risk Threshold):

   1. Total AEFI rate: 6.63 per 100,000 doses

   2. Serious AEFI rate: 1.51 per 100,000 doses

2. AstraZeneca Vaccine (Curtailed for Safety Concerns by April 2021):

   1. Total AEFI rate: 76.23 per 100,000 doses

   2. Serious AEFI rate: 15.49 per 100,000 doses

The Alarming COVID-19 Vaccine Reality

64 lots from Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and CoviShield vaccines, a total of 7,572,946 doses, were administered in BC as of Sept 15^th, 2021. Key findings include:

• 59 out of 64 lots (92%) had AEFI rates exceeding the flu vaccine baseline.

• AEFI rates ranged from 1.2 to 85.5 times higher than the flu baseline.

• 27 out of 64 lots (42%) had worse harm profiles (higher AEFI rates) than AstraZeneca, which had already been restricted due to safety issues.

• 22.4% of all COVID-19 vaccine doses administered in BC came from lots that exceeded AstraZeneca's serious AEFI rate.

• Total AEFI rates ranged from 0 to 567 per 100,000 doses

• Serious AEFI rates ranged from 0 to 121 per 100,000 doses

Manufacturing Quality Crisis

The wide variability in total and serious AEFI relative risk vs. historic flu (ranging from 1.2 to 85.5 times higher than flu baselines) points to significant inconsistencies in manufacturing quality control, suggesting fundamental failures in the production process.

The Distribution Pattern: Evidence of Systematic Harms Management

An analysis of dose distribution by AEFI rates revealed a clear inverse relationship: fewer doses were administered from higher-AEFI lots, indicating systematic harms management.

This is illustrated in the following table:

This inverse pattern—where more harmful lots accounted for fewer doses—suggests two possibilities:

1. Manufacturers supplied smaller quantities of the more harmful lots, or

2. BC public health officials quietly limited or withdrew distribution of the most harmful lots as AEFI reports accumulated, while allowing continued use of others that still exceeded safety benchmarks.

The Smoking Gun: Dr. Henry's Statement #8

This distribution approach aligns with Dr. Henry's Statement #8 from March 15, 2021: " These reactions are not uncommon and we continue to monitor our distribution to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot or not." The emphasis on "distribution" suggests active management of lots based on emerging AEFI data to prevent disproportionate associations with specific batches.

The Two-Tier System Exposed

The data suggests that Dr. Henry, the BC CDC, and BC's regional Health Authorities were aware of significantly elevated harms in specific COVID-19 vaccine lots. It reveals a two-tier approach:

• Public Messaging: Vaccines were presented as uniformly "safe and effective."

• Internal Management: Harmful lots were quietly withdrawn, while distribution continued for:

  • 27 lots more dangerous than the halted AstraZeneca vaccine,

  • Lots accounting for 22.4% of doses that exceeded AstraZeneca's serious AEFI rate, and

  • Quiet distribution curtailments to minimize exposure to the most harmful lots.

The inverse relationship between harm levels and doses administered supports the conclusion that BC health authorities managed vaccine risk by discreetly withdrawing harmful lots once AEFI rates exceeded certain thresholds. This approach allowed them to artificially maintain public confidence and minimize the expected oncoming harms to the population from the most dangerous lots, even as they continued using lots more harmful than AstraZeneca (whose distribution was curtailed for safety reasons). Overall, the pattern could be interpreted as managing vaccine program optics—emphasizing public reassurance—rather than prioritizing full transparency about emerging AEFI data.

Hope: BC’s Health Databases for Understanding COVID-19 Vaccine Injuries

During my research, I found that the BC CDC maintains unique de-identified population-based interlinked databases, including personal medical records, population data and prescription records for ~5 million people, linked to COVID-19 vaccination registries. I obtained descriptions of their structure and fields.

These databases enable ad hoc control groups that could generate clinical study results equivalent to what the Pfizer and Moderna trials would have produced if they had continued without termination and unblinding.

This linkage would provide a comprehensive map of vaccine-related harms, guiding health restoration strategies and would offer valuable insights for U.S. health authorities on post-vaccination trends.

Appendix

Supporting Data Tables

Complete data tables showing vaccine lot-specific AEFI rates and their multiples above flu vaccine baselines

March 15, 2021, AEFI Data (What Dr. Henry Knew)

Data sources¹⁴¹⁵

September 15, 2021, AEFI Data (Extended Pattern)

Comprehensive analysis of 64 vaccine lots showing systematic harm management

Dr. Henry's Public Statements - March 15, 2021

During her March 15, 2021 afternoon joint press conference, COVID-19 BC Update, Mar 15, 2021, with Health Minister Adrian Dix, Dr. Henry made the following key statements:

Statement #1 (4:45): "With the majority of our seniors and elders and care homes now immunized and seeing how effective that has been, today our masked clinics for seniors and elders in the community started off across the province and I think this is an exciting day for all of us. It is to start of what is going to be ramped up quickly over the next coming weeks and months to be sure that everybody in British Columbia has access to one of our safe and effective vaccines."

Statement #2 (5:35): "we extended the interval with the knowledge that we have about the protection we get from a single dose, that has meant we have not been able to accelerate many of the immunizations activities that we started and we have accelerated our timelines for protecting people across the province."

Statement #3 (5:54): "One of the important things that we do do is making sure that we understand the safety of every dose that is given to every person in this province.”

Statement #4 (6:05): “And we follow strict protocols to identify and address any safety signals that show up and we have heard about this around the world."

Statement #5 (6:15): "We report weekly on the adverse effects following immunizations (AEFIs) we call them. And this is important. We look for anything that people might have that, [would be, could be] related to the vaccine they receive within the timeframe after the receipt of vaccine we know that there are many events that happen on a regular basis every day whether..."

Statement #6 (6:52): "we have a process to see if the events that happened are related to the vaccine are not."

Statement #7 (7:00): "In BC we have had 469 AEFIs that are serious that we’ve looked into and 46 anaphylaxis, or allergic reactions to the vaccine..."

Statement #8 (7:22): "These reactions are not uncommon and we continue to monitor our distribution to make sure there is not more associated with a single lot or not."

Statement #9 (7:44): "We have seen reports in some countries that have led to them suspending the use of certain lots of the AstraZeneca vaccine in some countries around the world."

Statement #10 (8:28): "But we also know that they [conditions related to blood clots] are associated sometimes with COVID itself."

Statement #11 (9:16): "we are confident that is not a risk we are seeing here in Canada with the AstraZeneca..."

Statement #12 (9:29): "the other thing that I think is really important is you know our safety monitoring is working and we know that certain lot numbers might be more associated with these and others and that the investigation is happening."

Statement #13 (9:50): "sometimes these things happen in people who happen to receive immunization and we monitor to make sure that it's not greater than we might be expected..."

Statement #14 (9:58): "but we also know that infection with COVID-19 can lead to these types of conditions as well at a much higher rate we have seen that here in BC..."

Statement #15 (10:19): "we also know that the vaccines that we have are remarkably effective and safe and the risk of having the vaccine is dramatically decreased compared to the risk of having COVID-19."

Statement #16 (10:32): "There are no safety signals in the UK or in India or in Canada"

Statement #17 (12:19): "we knew that this was in consultation with my colleagues in public health using the vaccine to help break chains of transmission in communities particularly where we are seeing ongoing risk and transmission and clusters and outbreaks in workplaces these are the outbreaks that are happening now and [this helps us to reduce the transmission that we are seeing in our community right now] in the coming days..."

Statement #18 (14:34): "everyone who is immunized also protects the rest of us and when we immunize to manage these outbreaks that we are having right now putting out those sparks [reduces our community transmission and that protects us all]…"

Statement #19 (14:48): “… and it means that we all move up the line.”

Statement #20 (17:35): "the number of new cases is still very high much higher than I would like it to be..."

1. Senior HHS Adviser Confirms the Worst COVID Fears Were True

2. HHS Cuts Billions from mRNA Vaccine Contracts: NIH Director Bhattacharya Explains What’s Next

3. HHS Winds Down mRNA Vaccine Development Under BARDA

4. BREAKING - CDC Vaccine Safety Director May Have Destroyed Records, Says Sen. Ron Johnson

5. On May 21, 2025, Johnson's Senate committee released an interim report accusing federal agencies of downplaying myocarditis and other vaccine risks.

6. PHSA FOI F23-1799 (page 178)

7. PHSA FOI F23-1799 (page 172) BC CDC non-public AEFI report of March 15th 2021

8. PHSA FOI F23-1799 (page 172) BC CDC non-public AEFI report of March 15th 2021

9. Monika Naus Warned Bonnie Henry of a Toxic Lot

10. page 163, BC FOI request HTH-2021-11013

11. Conclusion of Review of FOI F23-1799 and BC Public Health’s Handling of COVID-19 Vaccines AEFI – Part 1

12. Does the COVID-19 Vaccination Reduce the Risk to Transmit SARS-CoV-2 to Others?

13. PHSA FOI F23-1799 (page 689) BC CDC non-public AEFI report of September 15th 2021

14. The AstraZeneca AEFI rates were taken from the Sept 15^th 2021 non-public AEFI report found on p. 689 of PHSA FOI F23-1799 and are included in the table for comparison purposes as a safety benchmark.

15. PHSA FOI F23-1799 (page 172) BC CDC non-public AEFI report of March 15th 2021